Paper ini mencoba mengkaji tumbuh kembang ny a Perda (Peraturan Daerah) Syatiat Islam di Indonesia masa kini. Sebagaimana kita ketahui, se.Jak lengsernya Presiden Soeharto (1998) 
Introduction
After the Muslim politicians had repeatedly failed to revive the Jakarta Charter on the national level, they currently appear to be using another way to formalize .ryari' ah laws: by fighting for it on the local level. Presumably, this shift is what Oliver Roy called 'Islamisation from the bottom up.'
1 Concerning this issue, there are 52 districts which have been implementing SRRs (Sharia Regional Regulations) in Indonesia, all of them districts/municipalities with a Muslim majority such as Maros, Bulukumba, Gowa, Cianjur, Garut, Indramayu, Banjar, Pamekasan, and Padang.2 Needless to say, the rise of this phenomenon has been tri gg ered by the shift in Indonesia's political legal system which has changed drastically from a centralized to a decentralized system. Since this era, there have been a number of local leaders who established .ryari' ah regulations and reclaimed their local identity.
3 They officially utilize the Local Autonomy Laws (UU no. 22/1999, later on revised by UU no. 32/2004) in supporting their political interests. This paper will elaborate on the application of .ryari' ah laws in two provinces with a Muslim majority; South Sulawesi and West Java. Both of these regions are known as 'the core supporters' of Islamic political parties and the strongholds of the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) movement in the 1950s. 4 This indicates that the Islamic sentiments in both regions are similar, although they are different to some extent. In recent years, they have been classified as provinces that rank just below Aceh in formalizing .ryari' ah inspired laws. It is interesting to investigate who the actors involved in supporting these enactments With the support of these prominent fi gur es, KPPSI rapidly proliferated in South Sulawesi. In six months, it was present in all districts of South Sulawesi except for Tana Toraja and Sinjai, which were considered politically non-conducive districts. 1 0 The rapid establishment of this organization is seen as a normal phenomenon since the majority of the South Sulawesi people religiously honour and are obedient to public fi gu res. Based on Andy Ramly's interview,1 1 when KPPSI founded their branches in certain districts/municipalities, a number of local people did not understand KPPSI's agenda, which was to establish syari' ah in the province. Some even thought that KPPSI was a new political party, or part of it.
The KPPSI was pioneered by three Muslim activists from South Sulawesi who had joined in the FUI organisation, 12 Aziz Qahhar Muzakkar, Aswar Hasan and A gu s Dwikarna. These three Muslim activists are quite popular among Islamic leaders in South Sulawesi. Therefore it is not surprising that when they proposed the idea of formalizing the syari'ah, the local 'ulamd' (religious scholars) and politicians responded positively. Moreover, it was also in accordance with the heated discussion about the regional autonomy law in the Jakarta parliament. 
,
At the end of December 2001, the second KUI congress was held from the 29 th to the 31 st at Asrama Haji Sudiang, Makassar. It was only one year after the previous congress. The main target of this congress was the establishment of 'Rumah Politzk' in the form of special autonomy as a legal umbrella for the application of SRRs in all districts/municipalities of South Sulawesi. During this congress KPPSI demanded the local government, the DPRD (the Regional People's Representative Council), and DPR RI (the National People's Representative Council) to issue a special autonomy law for the South Sulawesi province.
15 If their aspirations would not be accommodated, the congress would decide to take a 'Referendum' step, between special autonomy and independence.
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This menacing demand was inspired by the precedent of Aceh, which has already obtained special autonomy for the application of .ryati'ah laws. As declared in the first KUI congress 'the existence of UU no.44/1999 about the special status for Aceh,17 which gives authority to Aceh to implement .ryati'ah Islam, is proof that UUD 45 has not closed the opportunity to adopt .ryati'ah laws in this country.' However, the KPPSI's struggle has been cut short by the bomb blast which occurred on the second day of the congress (30 December 2001). Five months later, on 13 May 2002, three members of the KPPSI organization were arrested in the Philippines at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila, because they were allegedly carrying explosives (C4) and bomb devices in their luggage. They were Tamsil Linrung (a member of Mqjelis S y uro of KPPSI), Agus Dwikarna (the Head of Laskar Jundullah), and Abdul Jamal Balfas (a businessman).
18 Tamsil and Jamal were later released but Dwikarna was sentenced to jail for ten years and one month.
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The Connection between KPPSI and DI Movements
The possible connection between the KPPSI and the former DI movement is a concern for many people. DI was an insurgence movement, which turned away from the central government's policy and proclaimed the NII (Indonesian Islamic State). Basically, it was a regional movement which was primary led by local strongmen. In the beginning, it was operated in West Java under the leadership of Soekarmadji Kartosoewirjo. However, after three years, it expanded the KPPSI can be categorized as a social movement. First, it is not merely a spontaneous movement; it is formally organized. This can be concluded from the Declaration document of the KUI congress and KPPSI's political acts. Second, its strategies to implement the [Jari' ah are deliberately planned and conducted in a democratic way. The movement engages many Islamic groups ranging from ulama, to intellectuals, communities, and political elites. Third is the issue of endurance. Though KPPSI's long term political targets are still uncertain, as the formalisation of ryari' ah had once been applied during the DI/TII period in South Sulawesi, and even before Indonesia's independence, like the implementation of ryari' ah law in the Gowa Kingdom, but KPPSI frequently uses this historical reason to legitimate their political goal. They fundamentally believe that the moral vices of society can be immediately remedied by applying [Jari'ah laws.
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It is not easy to investigate the connection between the KPPSI and the history of DI because the ryan-' ah movements in this province are part of a dynamic historical process. Politically, KPPSI has a different paradigm than DI in establishing [Jari' ah in South Sulawesi. DI used uncooperative ways to resist the secular system (democracy), whereas KPPSI formally uses democratic ways.31 However, it cannot SYi\RI'AI-I MOVEMENTS IN COMPi\Ri\S10: SOUTH SUI ,i\ w1;: s1 ,\ND WEST J,\ \',\ PROVINCE be denied that some members of the KPPSI used to be involved in the DI movement. In fact, it has a close ties to the MMI which clearly has a connection with DI. To sum it up, institutionally this movement does not have a connection with DI/TU, but politico-historically, the influence of the DI on this organisation cannot be denied because many former members of the DI are involved in the KPPSI.
Factors Driving the Mushrooming of SRRs
There are three factors that support the spread of these regulations. The first is the political context; since the end of the New Order the public space for Muslim politics, ranging from the radical to the liberal, is no longer banned by state. This openness of the political sphere increased the number of political contestants in the country, and along with it the ry ari'ah regulations in the provinces. It is also important to note that the ry ari'ah movement 'from the bottom up' is tri gg ered in large part by the Regional Autonomy Law; that is why the KPPSI demanded the application of a special autonomy status for the implementation of ry ari'ah laws in the South Sulawesi province? 2 Moreover, before every Pifkada (local election) there are many political leaders favouring the enactment of SRRs to prove their Islamic credentials, especially the candidates coming from Nationalist parties like Golkar and PDI-P. In many cases these Bupati car;didates do not have an Islamist political agenda. They simply campai gn based on what they think are popular regulations.
33 Indeed, in many areas that have a strong Islamic sentiment or former DI strongholds such as Sinjai, Maros and Bulukumba, these political circumstances are a promising chance for Muslim politics to infuse their political goal.
The second factor is the historical roots of Islam. In the seventeenth century, Islam played a political role in South Sulawesi when the king of Gowa officially converted to Islam in 1605.
34 As a result, Islam became the official religion of the kingdom and the people were obliged to embrace Islam to show their loyalty to the king.3 5 According to Anthony Reid, the Islamisation process involved three 'ufamd' from Minangkabau; Dato Ri Bandang, Dato Ri Patimang, and Dato Ri Tiro.36 The diffusion started in several small kingdoms of South Sulawesi such as Tanete, Bantaeng, Bulukumba, Jenneponto, Selayar and Mandar. In these small kingdoms, Islamisation happened peacefully because they fell under the authority of the king of Gowa. However, it came to warfare when the religion was transmitted to the Bugis kingdoms such as Luwu, Bone, Wajo, Soppeng and Rappang, because they were the largest kingdoms in South Sulawesi. However, in the end they embraced Islam as well. 3 7 Another issue was when Kahar Muzakkar officially declared himself to be part of Kartosuwrijo's DI movement on 7 August 1953. As has been discussed before, apart from rebelling against the central government, Kahar Muzakkar also adopted the !Jari'ah laws in the territories under his authority. This is known through various documents published by Darn/ Islam in South Sulawesi, such as the Catatan Batin (spiritual note), Program Politik Islam Revolusioner (Programme for Revolutionary Islamic Politics), and the Piagam Makalua (Makalua Charter).
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The third factor is the local culture, the cultural norm known in South Sulawesi society as panngademng (Bugis) or panngadakang (Makassar) .
39 This norm of conduct is comprised of five elements: a) ade' tana, a tradition which is related to political power; b) wicara, a concept which more or less deals with the justice system like procedural law in national positive law; c) rapang, which serves to preserve the continuity of unwritten laws from the past by creating an analogy between the past and the present case, d) wari', which functions to classify the rights, obligation, and social strata, e) sara' (!Jari'ah), the complementary element of the panggadakang norm which organises the institutions and Islamic law regulations.4( ' Aside from the five norms above, Bugis and Makassar people also believe in the concept of siri' which means honor, dignity or courtesy. It is always identical with the value of life, which means that the people are ready to sacrifice everything, including their life, for the sake of siri' if his or her dignity has been attacked.
41 Cultural norms such as ade', sara', and siri' bind the KPPSI alliance based on the philosophical slogan of taro ada' taro gau' (words and actions should be in accordance).
42 Thereby, Islam has become a crucial aspect of South Sulawesi culture.
The Enactment of Syari'ah Regional Regulations
Responding to the demands of the KPPSI concerning the implementation of !Jan-'ah laws with special autonomy status in South Sulawesi, the provincial government formed a polling team, Balitbangda implementation in their district. During the campaign period, syari'ah Islam issues gained a high-ranking position in the political race, 53 while the contents of the local regulations were nothing but religious symbolism rather than basic needs such as solutions for poverty, corruption, and social justice. Seemingly, these regulations are frequently used by incumbent local elites to avert public attention from the corrupted bureaucracy and poverty issues. Together with the increase of syari'ah regulations, there were several corruption cases which implicated the office of the Bupati Bulukumba directly: a) the construction of Tenate market; b) the construction of an Islamic centre; c) corruption in the KPUD (the Local General Elections Commission); d) the construction of a Kajang traditional house; e) supplying uniform dress for civil servants in Bulukumba; f) the reconstruction of the Head office DPRD Bulukumba (2004 -2009 costing 200 million; g) beras miskin program (raskin, the program of rice donations for poor families; h) fishing Department; and i) housing allowances for DPRD members.
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In the politik aliran context, the phenomenon of SRRs is also interesting to analyse since the idea is strongly supported by nationalist parties such as Golkar and PDI-P. As discussed above, the case of KPPSI in South Sulawesi province epitomises the vagueness of aliran politics in Indonesia. The engagement of nationalist political parties which support the implementation of the syari'ah strengthens the previous analysis that the current aliran politics in Indonesia has gone through a big character change compared to earlier periods.
55 They tend to be more pragmatic than ideologic in achieving their political goals. The case of the formalization if ryari'ah in South Sulawesi pointis out that their political stance is somewhat ambivalent, since Golkar and PDI-P have been known to firmly oppose the implementation of Islamic syari'ah in NKRI.
Above all, I have compiled a list of ryari'ah regional regulations in South Sulawesi and West Java from various sources.
56 In South Sulawesi there are 36 regional regulations/Bupati edicts influenced by ryan-'ah; this number does not include raperda ( draft or proposed legislation) influenced by ryari'ah. If these regulations are classified following Arskal Salim's categorization, it will distinctly show ,vhat types of local regulations are issued most. There are fifteen regulations ( 42 percent) relating to religious skills and alms giving, such as zakah management and the ability of reciting al-Qur'an for students, civil servants, and couples seeking to get married. Second are ,\] ,Q,\L,\,\ [ the regional regulations which relate to morality issues, there are eleven regulations (30 percent) in this category, such as prohibition of prostitution, sale or consumption of alcoholic drinks, and gambling. This is followed by the category of religious symbolism, which is slightly different from the categories above it. There are ten regulations (28 percent) which require wearing Muslim garb such as jilbab, peci, and bcgu koko. See figure 1 below: The Rise and Fall of SRR numbeFS -+-Number of Shari'a Regional Regulation
Regional Regulations Influenced by Sharia
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Meanwhile, in the political arena, the chart above shows that the peak of the phenomenon was in 2005, with nine regulations, followed by slightly lower numbers in the next two years. In 2006 and 2007 the number of regulations was the same, in each of them eight SRRs were issued. Presumably, the sharp increase during these three years was mainly the result of the controversy about the pornography draft bill in national politics. Indirectly, it helped to support the rise of 
Syari'ah Regional Regulations in West Java: a Comparative Analysis
No different from South Sulawesi, the communities in the West Java province are known to be deeply devout Muslims. They are the majority of the population in this region; the data of Litbang Kompas show that approximately 97 ,3 percent of the forty billion people in West Java are Muslim.
57 Probably this is why syari'ah regulation has also emerged in this region, even though it is not as massive and organised as in South Sulawesi. It only reaches certain districts, and has not happened in the capital city of the province.
The West Java province is located in the Western part of Indonesia; it borders with Banten and Jakarta in the North and Middle Java in the East. The area-of the land is 34.816,96 km 2 , surrounded b y mountainous lands in the Southern and central areas. sa This province consists of sixteen districts and nine municipalities or 25 districts and municipalities in total. Some of them were once the 'de facto' territories of the DI movement in Indonesia where the syari'ah laws had been applied, places such as Garut, Cianjur and Tasikmalaya. Therefore, it is interesting to study this case to see whether there is a historical link between the current syari'ah movement and the former DI rebellion.
Unlike South Sulawesi, implementation of the syari'ah in this province has not reached the provincial level. It only reached four districts: Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciajur, and Indramayu. However, it is important to note that the first emergence of syari'ah regulation in Indonesia was in this province in 2000. This means it was one year earlier than in South Sulawesi. Garut was the first one of the districts that officially issued a regulation influenced by ryari'ah in Indonesia. In 2000, the DPRD issued the regional regulation against vice (Perda no.6/2000), and not long after, the Bupati issued a circular which ,\LQ,\L\M stated the requirement for female civil servants to wear jilbab on weekdays. The release of this local regulation gave militant Muslim groups the idea that they had been given the legitimation for a 'sweeping operation' against prostitutes, which included burning kiosks that were suspected of being a transaction location for lelaki hidung belang (lady seekers).
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On 15 January 2002 they declared Komite Penegak S y ari'at Islam (KPSI, Committee for the Implementation of Syari'ah Islam) which aims to apply syari'ah regulations in Garut. This committee was led by K.H. Endang Yusuf who was also the leader of the Garut branch of the FPL In response to this, the DPRD and the local government founded Lemb aga Pengkajian Penegakan dan Penerapan Syari'at Islam (LP3SI, the Implementation Body of S y ari'ah Islam) on January 15, 2002.
60 The founding of LP3SI was more of a tool for political accommodation in order to avoid collective anarchism than a research institution for the formulation of syarf'ah Islam. Evidently, there has not been any progress since the demands for the implementation of Another case is Cianjur, where the nuance of syari'ah symbolism was also very visible. Some regent candidates utilize it as a means of political strategy to win the hearts of Muslim voters in every local election. In the past two local elections, 2001 and 2006, the application of syan·'ah Islam has evidently been a political commodity in this district. Liya Yulia, the researcher of the Marhamah Society, claims that before the local election, the former Bupati Wasidi si gn ed a political contract which stated that if he was chosen as bupati, he would be ready to formalise syan·'ah Islam in Cianjur. Therefore, when he was finally chosen as bupati, he immediately issued a Bupati edict that introduced the Gerbang Marhamah concept.
61 His idea about Gerbang Marhamah was announced during the event for the Islamic New Year, Muharram 1, 1422 H (March 26, 2001 ). He gave a speech on this topic in front of thousands of jamaah (Muslim societies) in Cianjur Square. However, he also emphasized that the idea of implementing the syari'ah does not mean creating an Islamic country, but it is done to fix the current decadence and immorality among Muslims.<>2 Furthermore, the event brought forth an ikrar bersama (collective statement) of the Cianjur Muslims which was si gn ed by 35 social organizations.
63 The contents were similar to that of the KUI from Makassar, which states that !Jari' ah Islam is a worldview and the solution towards the multi-dimensional problems that Indonesia is facing, which is why they argued that the application of !Jari' ah in ktijfah (comprehensively) is needed in society's daily lives. 64 This aspiration was given shape by the Bupati and DPRD by creating Lembaga Pengkqjian dan Pengembangan Islam (LPPI, Institute for Islamic Study and Development) which aims to prepare the introduction of Islamic !Jari' ah in Cianjur. Furthermore, the Bupati released a circular about the obligation for female civil servants to wear a jilbab on weekdays, the movement of akhlakul karimah state apparatus, and marhamah society in 2001.
65 Along with the Bupati, the DPRD issued a !Jari' ah regulation on zaktih management (perda no.7 /2004).
On 30 January 2006, the incumbent Bupati Wasidi renominated himself for bupati in the upcoming election. He used !Jari' ah symbolism to gain support from Muslim voters but lost to Tjejep Muhtar with a difference of 0,29 percent (309 .181 votes: 311.802 votes).
66 Based on the Nawala research, both candidates used the !Jari' ah Islam issue to gain support, but the incumbent Bupati Wasidi was believed to be too 'soft' on Christians because he allowed the building of a new church in the Gereja Lembah Karmel area.
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Although Wasidi Swastomo was the undeniable pioneer for f�rmalising !Jari' ah regulation in Cianjur, the religious sentiment in society was too strong, especially regarding the issues of the new churchy and the deviating Islamic sects, such as the case of the Ahmadiyah which occurred one year before the election, on 19 September 2005. The Bupati edict was also supported by the 'ajengan bendo' ( 'u/amd' group). They were juru dakwah (Islamic transmitters) who were critical of Soeharto's policies and gained public sympathy during the Tasikmalaya riot in 1996. Some of them were affiliated with Islamic parties and hardliner Islamic groups such as the FPI, Laskar Taliban, and GPI (Islamic Youth Movement). They often used circulars and Tasikmalaya's vision of becoming an Islamic santri city to legitimate their violent activities under the banner of Islam, such as prostitution raids and arresting alcohol sellers, and their anti-vice movement. One day they mistakenly arrested a woman who was walking alone at night and they immediately shaved her head because she was without her muhrim (close relative). In fact, the reason why she walked alone at night was because of the public transportation strike. 73 Furthermore, in November 2002, Bupati Irianto MS Syaifuddin (Yance) announced that he would apply the syari'ah in Indramayu. He announced this during the celebration of Indramayu's 475 th anniversary. The idea of implementing syari'ah was initially inspired by the increase in poverty, criminality, and prostitution.
74 As an early move, Bupati Yance obligated female civil servants to wear a ji/bab and the males to wear a bqju koko every Friday. Before beginning work, the workers must also read al-Qur'an and fast Senin-Kamis (Monday and Thursday). 
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Between DI Links and Political Commodity
The West Java province was known as the centre of the DI/TII movement. Under the leadership of Kartosoewirjo this movement had spread widely to the regions of Java, Aceh, Sout h Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. He opposed the central government for approximately thirteen years. Rebellionhas occurred frequently in the history of this province, especially rebellions based onreligious sentiments such as the Cianjur-Sukabumi incident on 22 September 1885 about the Tarekat Naq.ryabandryah movement, which opposed the Dutch colonial government; and Patih Sukabumi, 77 the rebellion of Banten farmers which involved a number of religious leaders, kyai and hqji, on 9-30 July 1888;
78 and the resistance movement of Haji Hasan group in Leles (Garut) which was exterminated by the Dutch colonial government on July 7, 1919. Historically, Islam came to West Java in 1470 M, which means 135 years before it arrived in South Sulawesi (1605 M). It was spread by Syarif Hidayat who was. known as Syarif Hidayatullah or Sunan Gunung Jati. According to the story of Purwaka Camban Nagari, Syarif Hidayat was the son of Maulana Sultan Muhammad from the Arab world and Nyi Lara Santang, Prabu Siliwangi's daughter from the Padjajaran Kingdom. Before arriving in Cirebon, Syarif Hidayat introduced himself and taught Sunan Ampel (S qyy id Rahmat) how to preach Islam in Pasundan land. 79 Since that time Islam is widely known among Sundanese people and they are considered to be religious Muslims. A report of the Residen Priangan Ooshout successor ( on 4 November 1907) states that 'Sundanese people are more religious than Javanese, which is why the government has to be careful in permitting Arabs to journey to this region.'&J Therefore, it is understandable that the idea of implementing the ryari'ah has always had a place in West Javanese society. Fifty years ago, Kartosoewirjo (1905 Kartosoewirjo ( -1962 applied ryari'ah Islam in the 'de facto' DI territories of this province. Some scholars commented that the Islamic symbolisation that Kartosoewirjo used was only a political strategy to gain the support and sympathy of the Sundanese people.
,\LQ,\Lt\:\I
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The emergence of the DI movement was tri gg ered by his dissatisfaction with the Renville agreement which did not involve him in bringing the territorial authority of West Java back under control.
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Therefore, the Islamic sentiment was only used as a political tool. This rebellion occured from 1948-1962, and he was finally arrested in Mount Geber Majalaya, West Java, and was sentenced to death on Soekarno's order on September 5, 1962.
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Furthermore, Kartosoewirjo's idea was revived by former DI/TII members. They formed a number of Regional Commandos that were scattered throughout several regions as discussed earlier.
They still fight for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Some fight constitutionally, whereas some choose to work underground. As it happens, the region that currently applies syari'ah regulations used to be part of the de facto DI/TII territories such as Garut, Cianjur, and Tasikmalaya. In Cianjur the survival of the syari'ah movement was once linked with NII KW-9 (NII Commandment Region IX) whose historical link was to DI and Pondok Pesantren al Zaitun.83 However, this connection was immediately rejected by bupati Wasidi. Cited from an interview between him and Kiblat Umat site, the Bupati stated that the implementation of syan-'ah Islam with the Gerbang Marhamah was not a movement that wanted to create an Islamic state, but was meant as a 'middle way' which accommodated the aspirations-of the Muslim majority of Cianjur in the NKRI corridor.
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However, the idea of the Bupati was also used by Abu Toto (the leader of KW 9). Like the KPPSI South Sulawesi movement, the NII KW 9 requested that the Bupati and DPRD immediately issue the syan-'ah regulation, particularly on the requirement to wear the jilbab.
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The NII KW 9 and KPPSI are somewhat similar, the only difference being that the number of actors here was not as massive and organized as KPPSI in South Sulawesi and was more reactive than proactive.
In Tasikmalaya, the application of syari'ah regulation after the reformation era was strongly affected by the historical memory of the DI/TII. The proponents of the syari' ah movement reinterpreted the DI/TII history with the new version. They argued that DI/TII is one of the historical proofs of how deeply rooted Islamic politics are in this region.
86 However, they were systematically sti gm atized by the government during the New Order era. They claimed that Soeharto intended to eliminate the spirit of Muslim politics in order to maintain his position. 87 The historical reinterpretation appeared together with the demand for the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter by the PBB and the PPP in the Annual Session of the MPR. In the 1999 and 2004 general elections, the PPP became a dominant party in this district. The victory of this party meant their cadres gained seats in the DPRD. It was from with people that the idea of implementing syari'ah appeared in the local government, especially since it was together with the issue of the reinclusion of the Jakarta Charter.
In this political climate, the syari'ah became a promising political commodity for Bupati candidates during the Tasikamalaya Bupati election of 2001. As discussed above, Bupati Wasidi created a political contract with PPP, GPI, Brigade Taliban, and FPI which stated his commitment to apply regional syari'ah laws in Cianjur if he would be chosen.
88 This is important to note because at that time the Bupati was still selected by DPRD, not chosen through direct democracy. Presumably this political context was what made Bupati Wasidi interested in signing the 'political contract,' considering the large number of DPRD members coming from a position of Muslim formalism.
Aside from Tasikmalaya and Cianjur, Garut was also a region which was heavy with religious sentiment and the history of the Islamic movement. In 1919 K.H. Hasan Arief (a leading fi gur e of Syarikat Islam) led a rebellion; they refused to transport the harvest to the Dutch Colonial Government. This incident was known as the Cimareme movement.
89 Later on during the Japanese occupation a sufah institute in Garut which was originally intended to provide religious education was changed into a centre for paramilitary training for Muslim youth (Hizbullah and Sabilillah).90 Some scholars argue that this was the growth of the DI/TII seed. In the following periods, Kartosoewirjo turned Malangbong-Garut into centre of Islamic syari'ah activities and application.91 He founded a press to print important documents for the DI/TII movement. Their admiration notwithstanding, the current syari'ah formalism in Garut district is, theoretically speaking, far from the social movement category because their actions appear to be unorganized and subject to merely short periods of interest. Khoirunnisa's field research data demonstrate that the idea of implementing syari'ah is only discussed amongst the elites, since 85 percent of the common people do not understand what formalisation of the syan-'ah means. 94 So far, they understand syan-'ah to be an act of religious rituality that they have been accustomed to conducting in their daily lives, such as praying, fasting and zakdh, which is more flexible than the formalist understanding. In comparison, the number of local regulations which have been issued in West Java is not as high as that in South Sulawesi, even though they were the pioneers of formalising syari'ah regulation. Up to the present day (2008) there are only ten syari'ah regulations in West Java; four regulations related to morality, four regulations related to religious symbolism, and only two regulations related to syari'ah compulsories.
Closing Remarks
The idea of syari'ah formalisation has emerged since the early days of Indonesian modem history. From the previous times Muslim politics always demanded that the state formalise the Islamic laws in the country, but they failed repeatedly. During the Old Order-period, the concept of the Jakarta Charter became the topic of a lengthy controversial debate between Nationalist and Muslim groups. During the New Order period, demands of syari'ah implementation were never heard, but this did not mean that the aspirations had disappeared. Markedly, a number of Islamic parties have reemerged since the collapse of the New Order. The PPP and the PBB have even officially called for the re-inclusion of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter in 2001 and 2002, but failed in their attempts.
Lately syan-'ah formalisation has proliferated widely in local governments, including those in South Sulawesi and the West Java province. As discussed earlier, these two provinces have a long history in dealing with the implementation of the syari'ah. The majority of both populations are devout Muslims, but they have different cultural characteristics. In the 1955 elections the Islamic parties dominatedin these two regions, but since the fusion of Islamic political parties in 1973, the Muslim vote became fragmented and Muslims also affiliated with the nationalist parties. It may be that the idea of applying syari'ah 
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Al!Mr\D ANFASUL MAROM in local districts, put forth by nationalist parties such as Golkar and PD I-P in South Sulawesi, can be traced back to this period. This phenomenon shows how drastic the shift of political ideology in Indonesia is, where throughout the Old and New Order eras those political parties were not interested in using Islamic issues.
In conclusion, the actors of Islamic formalisation in these two provinces can be divided into two categories; formal and informal institutions. In South Sulawesi the formal actors are comprised of a Governor, Bupati/ Walikota, and all of the DPRD province members. The informal actors come from the Islamic organizations that were involved in the KPPSI alliance. Both types of actors jointly demanded that the central government give a special autonomy status to South Sulawesi in implementing the syari'ah. Notwithstanding the fact that their demands were denied, most of the districts have officially issued syari'ah regulations (36 SRRs in total), including the provincial government. Looking at this kind of organisation and the involvement of a number of former DI members, it can be concluded that culturally the KPPSI has a link to the former DI, but not structurally.
In West Java, the application of syari'ah only succeeded in four out of twenty-five districts, namely Garut, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Indramayu (in total there are ten syari'ah regulations in these districts). In general the formal actors of these districts only consist of the Bupati and the PPP frat:tion in-the DPRD. This is considerably different from South Sulawesi where it was fully supported by all members of the legislative and executive branches of the government. In addition, the informal actors also did not appear as organized as the KPPSI in South Sulawesi. They are manifested in various organizations such as FPI, NII KW 9, KPSI, LPPI, GPI, and Laskar Taliban. In many cases, the local elites use the syari'ah issues to win the hearts of Muslim voters in local election events. In those moments, the rise of syari'ah implementation tends to be closer to a political commodity than the D'a·ri'ah movement which was linked to the former DI movement.
Endnotes:
1 This strategic change is usually characterized as neo-fundementalism; syari'ah minded, Islamic purification, anti-Western. Oliver Roy, The Failure�( Political Islam (London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 1999 ) 
